Asset Distribution and Productivity: Best Practices for Developing This Synergistic Relationship by Willbanks Wiesner, Wendy Lee
University of Denver 
Digital Commons @ DU 
Electronic Theses and Dissertations Graduate Studies 
1-1-2010 
Asset Distribution and Productivity: Best Practices for Developing 
This Synergistic Relationship 
Wendy Lee Willbanks Wiesner 
University of Denver 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd 
 Part of the Growth and Development Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Willbanks Wiesner, Wendy Lee, "Asset Distribution and Productivity: Best Practices for Developing This 
Synergistic Relationship" (2010). Electronic Theses and Dissertations. 707. 
https://digitalcommons.du.edu/etd/707 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Studies at Digital Commons @ DU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Electronic Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital 
Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
ASSET DISTRIBUTION AND PRODUCTIVITY:  BEST PRACTICES FOR 






the Faculty of Social Sciences 




In Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 





Wendy Willbanks Wiesner 
June 2010 
Advisor: Dr. Tracy Mott 
 
©Copyright by Wendy Willbanks Wiesner 2010 
All Rights Reserved 
 
 ii 
Author: Wendy Willbanks Wiesner 
Title: ASSET DISTRIBUTION AND PRODUCTIVITY:  BEST PRACTICES FOR 
DEVELOPING THIS SYNERGISTIC RELATIONSHIP 
Advisor: Dr. Tracy Mott 
Degree Date: June 2010 
Abstract 
 
Productivity is an essential component of lasting corporate success.  It is also a 
critical ingredient in the recipe for making a vibrant and prosperous community.   
Economics recognizes that both capital and labor make contributions to 
productivity through the functions of investment and production.  Enhancements to 
productivity can be obtained in multiple areas, including technological advancement, 
corporate expansion, market penetration, and product development.  Sustained 
productivity growth, however, is predicated upon continual process improvement and 
market innovation.   
Identifying precisely “who” and “what” are contributing to productivity is 
challenging.  Because capital and labor interact, it is difficult to determine whether the 
positive effect is due to the man or the machine.  Evaluating the contributions of labor 
alone is complicated, as people are productive both as individuals and in working 
together as a group.  It is hard to imagine a situation where a competitive advantage is 
obtained without cooperation.  Nevertheless, economics is theoretically geared toward 
atomistic contributions to productivity. 
Making any significant achievement within a corporation or community requires 
input from a variety of entities having a willingness to commit their time and energy to a 
particular effort.  Because the path to improvement involves making mistakes and 
learning-by-doing, patience is involved.  Often short-term gratification must be sacrificed 
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for long-term gain; incurring costs today in the hope of revenues tomorrow.  This trade-
off affects both costs and profits.  Because short-term profits are the predominant 
incentive for investment capital, and marginal costs are the key determinant of wages, 
favorable behaviors on either the investment or production front are not automatically 
rewarded.  Attention must be given to asset development, if incentives are to be 
structured properly. 
In this paper, I emphasize the importance of using specific asset-based methods 
and financial tools to fairly and efficiently distribute contributions to productivity.  
Corporations will find these methods equally desirable because they can be used to 
generate low-cost, highly-accessible finance capital.  These incentive structures include 
the Employee Stock Ownership Plan (ESOP), as well as other financial instruments that 
are built upon the foundation of the ESOP.  These include the CSOP (Customer Stock 
Ownership Plan), the CIC (Community Investment Corporation), and the CHA (Capital 
Homesteading Account). 
Although these variations of the ESOP address a wide variety of situations, they 
have yet to be tax-qualified like the ESOP.  I am hopeful that this will change.  To cover 
the landscape of what is available right now, however, the structures that include the 
Community Development Corporation (CDC), the Community Land Trust (CLT), and 
the Individual Development (IDA) are investigated. 
Because the future prosperity of individuals, corporations, and communities 
depends upon continuous improvement and innovation, contributions to productivity are 
of primary importance.  Just as important is the creation of a life and work environment 
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Chapter One:  Observations and Experiences 
Conventional Economic Wisdom--Productivity and the Creation of Value 
For over two hundred years, economists have been developing theories of value.  
In spite of various competing arguments that preclude any full agreement in this area, 
making the attribution and assessment of value a tangible, concrete, mathematical 
exercise remains a primary goal of economics. 
The production process is one way that value is created.  The factor inputs of 
capital and labor each have a unique contribution to productivity, one that is measured in 
the marginal product of capital and labor.  The marginal productivity of labor must equal 
its marginal cost, or the wage.  The marginal productivity of capital equals its rate of 
return.  The traditional assumption is that input costs adjust automatically, in response to 
competitive pressures and the demands of the marketplace. 
In addition the contributions made by the acknowledged factors of production 
including capital and labor, contributions are also embodied in the efficiency of the 
production process itself.  It is expected that methods and processes improve over time, 
with the development and implementation of new technologies ever-expanding 
productive capacity.  It is assumed that the productivity-enhancing effects of innovation 
are realized by labor, as technological advancements incorporated into equipment, 
machinery, tools and information processing make labor more efficient.   
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For production to create value, current and future investment must occur.  
Theoretically, this process is facilitated by a transformation of savings into investment, a 
function that is performed by financial intermediaries.  Traditional sources of finance 
include loans generated by financial institutions or other financial intermediaries, and 
public and private equity markets.  Investment capital can also be generated within the 
corporation, with the re-investment of retained earnings.  Availability of this type of 
finance is predicated upon the creation of surplus value, or profits.  Today, a majority of 
the capital that finances corporate expansion is carved out of retained earnings. 
At this point, it can be noted that the theoretical conceptions of production and 
investment are direct and straightforward.  Simplicity is what makes this no-nonsense 
approach possible.  If economic conclusions are to be made on the basis of quantitative 
analysis, a reductionist viewpoint is required.  Driving toward tidy, concrete answers, 
however, requires making a multitude of essential assumptions.  I have found that these 
artificially-imposed limitations make it virtually impossible to make an empirically 
realistic or reliable determination of who, are what, contributes to productivity.  Thus, the 
wellspring of value-creation remains a nebulous and opaque entity. 
Limitations of Conventional Economic Wisdom in the Attribution of Value 
Regarding the economic models associated with the production process, there are 
four areas where over-simplification has the potential to produce confusion and mis-
understanding.  First, there is an assertion that a person’s contribution in the value-
creation process can be measured directly by the marginal product, and that marginal 
cost, or the wage, is a realistic reflection of this contribution.  Second, there is the belief 
that the benefits generated by technological development and advancement will 
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automatically be reaped by labor, albeit in an abstract fashion.  Next, there is an 
assumption that contribution to productivity that can be fully realized and measured at 
any point in time, as a snap-shot view of the situation.  Third, capital and labor are 
viewed in a compartmentalized fashion, thus eliminating the possibility that a complex 
relationship between the two is a source of productivity enhancement.  Finally, the 
treatment of an individual as distinct labor unit, with a unique marginal cost and product 
attached, attributes value to individualized efforts that are motivated by competition.  
There is no avenue to consider the possibility that collaboration, cooperation, and 
collective effort creates value. 
The conception of investment also has limitations that can be clearly identified.  
Most questionable is the assumption that savings automatically transforms itself into 
investment, as Say’s Law would attest.  Economic theory views this process as naturally 
efficient, guided by a quest to maximize the return on capital.  With the expectation that 
this process effectively occurs without intervention, within a mysterious black box, it 
appears to me to be a magical thought.   
Extracting any truth out of this assumption relies upon faith in financial markets.  
One must believe that there is an innate capacity, or a natural proclivity on the part of the 
financial sector to channel capital into productive investment.  This interpretation ignores 
the possibility that financial intermediaries and firms may have conflicting interests, 
especially in their conception of the investment horizon.  It is a reasonable expectation 
that financial intermediaries will be motivated by the highest short-term returns.  
Conversely, firms will find that innovation and development requires learning-by-doing, 
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trial and error, and inevitable mis-steps.  Because the innovative process is not linear, it 
requires patience, risk-tolerance, and a long-term approach toward investment. 
Without question, any attempt to quantify contributions to productivity so that the 
larger question of value creation can be resolved is a necessarily imperfect exercise.  
Human beings are rich, varied, intertwined and complicated, just like the environment in 
which they live.  Nevertheless, various professional experiences have led me to seriously 
question whether the prevailing economic wisdom not only sacrifices completeness to 
achieve tangible conclusions, but is actually misguided to the extent that efficiency and 
fairness are routinely compromised.  
In the next set of anecdotal examples, I will highlight how the commonly-held 
economic viewpoints regarding contribution to productivity and value prove themselves 
to be flawed.  In these situational examples, there is no systemic means of linking 
productivity and contribution to returns and rewards.  The incentives are distorted, the 
outcomes do not promote the achievement of long-term objectives, and an environment 
that could have otherwise fostered continuous innovation and development is polluted. 
These experiences have led me to search for market-based methods that fairly, 
accurately, and efficiently distribute financial gains and the contributions made to 
productivity.  My findings will be discussed later in this paper, after I have covered the 








Chapter Two:  Two Examples Coming from the Real World 
A Situation Where Information has Value 
Few companies last over 100 years, but NCR, formerly known as National Cash 
Register, is one of them.  NCR has always been in the business of automating 
transactions, but since the 1980’s, the focus has narrowed to providing self-service 
technologies within the retail and financial sectors.  
From grocery store self check-out systems to automated teller machines (ATM’s), 
NCR has given customers the ability to help themselves.  Less apparent to the casual 
observer, but equally significant in impact, are the back-office technologies pioneered by 
NCR.  One example of NCR technology that has radically altered back office operations 
are image-based check and remittance processing systems.  Fundamentally changing core 
processes, these systems eliminate encoding, proofing, and sorting in all but the rarest of 
occasions.  Comprised of hardware equipped with image cameras and readers, along with 
software that incorporates neural networks and artificial intelligence, these systems are 
very sophisticated.  They read multiple fields of what could be considered to otherwise be 
indecipherable customer handwriting. 
For customers that include money center banks, the U.S. government, and the 
Federal Reserve, this technology has permanently altered the amount of administrative 
labor required to run any back office financial operation.  This image-based technology 
that got its initial traction in check and remittance processing departments addresses a 
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multitude of functional areas.  A host of documents, including loan and mortgage 
originations, Certificates of Deposit and account opening forms, can all be handled with 
limited human intervention.   
It is important to note that the proliferation of this technology compliments the 
recent growth of the internet.  The ever-increasing number of documents generated online 
capitalizes upon the efficiencies that have already been realized in the back office.  
Because the complete process has already been dissected and well understood, both 
existing and new systems can readily evolve. 
To effectively translate human activity to machine operation, the cooperation of 
the people that have been manually performing the process in the past is essential.  
Imparting this knowledge is like a technology transfer, with the enabling methodology 
referred to as a work flow analysis.  This effort, which requires asking many detailed 
questions, breaks a process into granular operations.  For the technology to work 
properly, for it to deliver the maximum benefit, the points of failure must be identified.  
Furthermore, the opportunities for improving efficiency must be determined if the system 
is to be cost-justified.   
Here a conundrum arises:  the individuals who provide the answers to the 
questions—those who provide the key information and details that determine the efficacy 
of system—are providing the justification for their own demise.  Technological 
advancement makes labor more productive, and as a result replaces it.   
In this case, it is clear that a wage-based reward system does not take into 
consideration either the short or long-term contributions that have been made in a highly 
cooperative effort.  Worse yet, there are in fact strong incentives to avoid the open 
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communication and sharing of practical, on-the-job information that promotes the 
efficient implementation of the system.  
Perspective regarding this situation, if guided by economic theory, provides 
certain insights.  With this assessment comes the acknowledgement that the proliferation 
of technology eliminates jobs, yet offers the possibility of new types of employment.  
These newly created opportunities may even be more desirable than the administratively-
oriented, manual, repetitive, relatively low-wage jobs that have been eliminated.  The 
opportunity exists to allocate labor more efficiently, into areas where machines are less 
capable than humans.  (As technology evolves, it is possible that this argument may 
become irrelevant). 
Nevertheless, the original problem endures:  the contributions to productivity in 
this particular situation are not correctly recognized or appropriately attributed.  Because 
the value is added in the asset development process, the contributions to productivity are 
realized in the return on investment.  Investment quality is reflected in the return on 
investment, as well as in corporate profits.  If the company is financing the investment 
out of retained earnings, the company benefits in both the investment and production 
spheres. 
In this and many other situations like it, the quality of the asset and the investment 
is predicated upon the contribution of knowledge and experience, not just the provision of 
capital.  The problem is that wages consider only the contributions to production, not the 
impact upon investment.  Capturing this contribution requires sharing in the profits or the 
ownership of the corporation.  This paper is committed investigating these asset-sharing 
methods. 
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A Case Where Publicly-Raised Equity Capital Becomes a Blunt Instrument 
Troy Systems Incorporated began as a company manufacturing and selling 
Magnetic Ink Character Recognition (MICR) hardware and supplies.  MICR technology 
generates specifically-formatted, machine-readable characters or fonts.  These numeric 
characters conform to a universally-established format that is recognized by central banks 
and financial institutions.   
Troy’s original systems were industrial-grade impact-printing devices with 
enormous MICR ribbons.  The equipment was deployed in the back-offices of national 
governments, central banks, blue-chip corporations, and financial institutions.  
Applications which are still in use today include check and remittance printing, along 
with the production of various other documents that are well-suited for machine 
readability, including lottery tickets. 
This technology evolved to include distributed laser-printing systems for bank 
branches, insurance company offices, and regional or satellite corporate offices.  Checks 
could be printed instantaneously in payroll departments, at teller windows, and at 
insurance company offices.  This manageably-sized technology was affordable, flexible, 
and applicable in a wide variety of environments.  One notable application is the on-the-
spot adjudication and payment of insurance claims. 
The emergence of online systems and the internet meant that the company had to 
offer new systems that could capitalize on electronic payment technologies.  To adapt to 
rapidly-changing market conditions, Troy purchased corporations that had and existing 
solution and customer base.  These companies had turn-key systems that were built to 
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utilize the national payment system owned by the Federal Reserve Bank, referred to as 
the Automated Clearinghouse House (ACH) network.   
The most prominent product acquired and developed at this time was an 
electronic check system branded “eCheck Secure”.  The initial application for eCheck 
Secure was the nascent online brokerage industry.  The electronic check system allowed 
brokerage customers to trade instantaneously, at any time of day or night, from the 
comfort of a home computer.  Other applications followed, with eCheck offered as on 
online payment system for internet shopping sights, electronic shopping carts, and online 
financial institutions.  The eCheck Secure product was the earliest entrant in this market 
that would later be dominated by a few players. 
Troy was a relatively small company, thus investment capital would have to be 
raised to acquire the companies that offered the electronic payment solutions.  The 
decision was made that the family-owned company would go public.  The strategy was to 
acquire other companies with stock rather than cash or debt.  Throughout the technology 
industry, stock had become the currency for acquisitions. 
This change in ownership gave employees the opportunity to participate in one of 
two ways.  The first method, and Employee Stock Purchase Plan (ESPP), was made 
available to all employees.  This program allowed employees to purchase discounted 
company stock that could be sold once the company completed the ownership transition.  
The second method of distributing ownership was through company stock options offered 
to key company employees.  Some of these options were gifted, and others were subject 
to future purchase.  These were restricted stock options that could not be executed until a 
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certain target date a few years after the corporation became listed on the public stock 
market. 
The company went public in 2000, at the height of technology IPO wave.  Soon 
after Troy went public, it became relatively clear that Troy stock, like other technology 
stocks, gained value from speculative investment activity.  The company quickly 
developed a formula for maximizing stock value by issuing a press release every Friday, 
one in which the announcement would be made that at least one new customer had been 
secured. 
Troy stock values soared every Friday, exhibiting exponential gains in value.  The 
pressure to produce a new customer announcement every Friday became intense.  
Influencing investor expectations and maintaining a high level of exposure and interest 
became more critical, as the competition from other IPO’s intensified.  The beneficiaries 
of this predictable pattern were investors or outsiders that were not affected selling 
restrictions.  Employees that purchased stock through the ESPP were also able to profit, 
as were extended family members that were not directly involved in the operations of the 
company. 
Most likely to benefit were the ESPP participants who had a shorter-term view of 
their employment or the company itself; employees with a longer-term view were less-
likely to sell their stock, anticipating that the stock would have sustainable value.  Some 
held their stock out of company loyalty, others had a basic perception that investing in 
public equity markets meant long-term holding to realize value. 
When the technology sector crashed a few years later, Troy stock values went 
down with the rest of the technology stock crowd.  The stock value had gone from a 
 17 
height of over $100 per share to less than $2.00 per share, just as the window for selling 
restricted stock options had opened.  The company eventually went back to private 
ownership, with the original owners buying out the prior owners and management of the 
acquired companies at a financial low-point. 
In this case, incentives for contributing to productivity have been perverted.  
Those who benefited included the following:  1) family members who held stock with no 
restrictions; 2) employees with a short-term attitude having less concern for the company 
as an ongoing concern; and 3) the original private owners of Troy who purchased 
companies with real products and revenue streams for a fraction of their original, pre-
acquisition value. 
This distortion meant that key, productive employees of Troy Systems with 
restricted stock options, along with the employees and owners of the acquired 
corporations that made real contributions to productivity, were on the losing side of the 
transaction.  Employees and investors that bought-into the corporation, who exhibited 
patience and developed trust—two positive qualities that are capable of enhancing 
productivity over time—either did not reap any rewards, or sacrificed the initial value of 
their corporations in the process.   
Public equity markets are just one avenue for obtaining finance capital.  As a 
result of my observations and experiences, I have investigated other methods of raising 
finance capital that have a greater propensity to fairly and efficiently combine investment 
with ownership, for both employees and other stakeholders.  In the next section, I provide 
an overview of the risks associated with traditional methods of obtaining finance capital, 








Chapter Three:  Practical Alternatives for Creating “Good” Investment Capital 
For individuals, corporations, and communities to become more resilient and 
productive, investment in current and future capacity must be made.  This is becoming 
increasingly more difficult today, given the current economic environment in which the 
availability of corporate finance is very limited, even for companies that have a solid 
track record and business plan.  Constriction of industrial credit was a trigger of 
economic crisis, and its continued scarcity is thwarting economic recovery today. 
The dearth of capital can in part be attributed to the complexion of global capital.  
This powerful economic force is naturally focused on short-term gains, and little 
concerned with long-term value.  These are the new rules for competing in the investment 
world, and many corporations, and most individuals, are no match for this highly-
focused, highly-trained juggernaut.  Non-professional financiers will most likely be on 
the losing side of the bet until new ways of approaching investment opportunities are 
championed. 
The solutions offered in this paper shift the focus from large, impersonal outside 
finance markets to internal opportunities, where corporations, communities, employees, 
customers, and individuals have the opportunity to invest in one another.  This approach 
creates a competitive advantage in three ways:  1) knowledge of sophisticated financial 
markets is not what matters, rather the information regarding the specific business, which 
is more readily available on the inside; 2) all parties have skin in the game, thus more 
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commitment to one another; and 3) the actions of all participants have the capacity to 
effect the outcome, or the return on investment.   
It is more critical than ever for corporations and individuals to strive for 
efficiency, develop new processes and technologies, and foster a culture of innovation to 
survive.  Because business conditions are increasingly driven by cost containment, 
culminating in a global race to the bottom, labor markets are precarious, wages are 
stagnant, and unemployment is high.  Employers are challenged to maximize employee 
productivity and invest in new technology to stay competitive, at a time when capital is 
incredibly scarce.  Retaining a customer base is more challenging, as intense price 
competition erodes loyalty and forces defections.  Both companies and individuals need 
equity cushions to survive today, and expand in the future. 
This paper is about corporations, employees, customers, and community members 
using certain structures in the current legal and financial system to distribute assets safely 
and effectively.  In the process of creating and maintaining these enabling structures, 
participants cooperate with one another.  It is in the very act of cooperating where 
productivity begins to thrive, where assets built today become the solid financial 
foundation of tomorrow. 
It was Louis Kelso, lawyer-economist and inventor of the ESOP (Employee Stock 
Ownership Plan), who developed the philosophical and legal architecture capable of 
harnessing this potential energy.  Although the details of the ESOP will be discussed at a 
later point in this paper, Kelso’s broader perspective that informed the invention of the 
ESOP is important at this point in the discussion.  The comments that Kelso (1975) made 
in an interview with the journalist Mike Wallace have contemporary resonance: 
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“Americans," says Kelso, "are a nation of industrial sharecroppers who work for 
somebody else and have no other source of income. If a man owns something that 
will produce a second income, he'll be a better customer for the things that 
American industry produces. But the problem is how to get the working man that 
second income" (Kelso Institute, 2000, p.1). 
Individuals need assets, and corporations need finance.  Individuals and 
companies working together, using the proper financial instruments and structures, can 
accomplish this task.  This collaboration also creates a competitive advantage in that a 
closer alignment of production and consumption better serves real needs.  
What is required is a change in our thinking about financial intermediaries.  What 
I am suggesting is a flattening of the bureaucratic structure that provides finance, with 
consumers and producers working directly together, literally or figuratively as a 
community, to meet their finance needs.  Much legitimate demand for finance is never 
met, given that most financial enterprises are not in the business of deeply understanding 
the nitty-gritty of business enterprises, unless the finance arm is private equity, where the 
goal of finance is often to “possess” a company rather than support its growth or 
expansion. 
Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFI’s) are by design an 
exception, in that their organizational structure fosters the development of community, 
company or industry-specific expertise, so that in-depth understanding can be used to 
guide finance decisions.  This hands-on, cooperative, more localized approach to finance 
has its place, even in a structure that brings end users, workers, and corporations together 
at the planning and development table.  In stark contrast, global capital is not 
fundamentally structured to have either knowledge of, or direct connection with, the 
community, industry, or company.   In fact, the recent growth in the finance industry has 
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been in the development of financial vehicles that fully alienate capital from its 
productive application, by selling-off, reconstituting, pooling, and subdividing whatever 
was the original purpose of finance.  Such examples are collateralized debt obligations 
and credit default swaps, the culprits in the recent crisis.  In simple terms, bankers that do 
not know the end-user customer distort markets and cause systemic problems.   
In the mean time, I have written about providing asset building opportunities 
primarily in closed markets, where speculation is not an issue.  Because they are closed 
markets, it is not a zero sum game, with one winner and one loser.  Both parties win by 
cooperating with one another.  The next section of this paper addresses asset-building 









Chapter Four: Overview of Asset-Distribution Methods 
Rewarding All Stakeholders for Their Contributions to Productivity 
In this paper, I provide an overview of financial instruments and organizational 
structures that are either expressly designed, or inherently capable of sharing assets.  In 
each case, I point out their intrinsic strengths and weaknesses, and compare the 
instruments to one another.  In some cases, I find that a financial instrument or structure 
that is not available today is superior to what already exists.  I present both what is 
available now and discuss how the situation could evolve. 
The tools that I favor build assets out of current productivity, using financial 
structures and instruments that are already part of the U.S. legal fabric.  These tools 
distribute productivity to stakeholders, who are defined here as those with a fair claim, or 
an earned or natural right to the distribution.  It is the participation of these stakeholders, 
either as employees, customers, or community members, that fundamentally contributes 
to the success of the entity in the first place.  Thus, the distribution is like an earned 
endowment.   
These earned endowments include equity stakes, property ownership, matched 
accounts for individuals, and shared ownership of public goods and services.  In 
searching for the best methods to fairly and efficiently distribute assets, I have focused 
upon four areas of opportunity.  First, I will cover corporate-sponsored plans that extend 
ownership to employees.  Second, the opportunity to expand corporate ownership to 
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include customers is investigated.  Next, I discuss community-based development and 
ownership of both private and public assets.  Finally, individual accounts that provide a 








Chapter Five:  Corporate-sponsored Plans that Incorporate Employee Ownership 
From the Defined-benefit Account to the Defined-contribution Account 
The earliest form of asset-sharing and distribution for corporate employees came 
in the form of a pension plan.  The earliest pension accounts were termed defined benefit 
plans, in that the company would promise an employee a defined benefit, or a certain 
monthly amount, after retirement.  The employee had no responsibility or control over 
the pension account, which was administrated by a trustee. 
By the 1960’s, traditional defined-benefit plans had earned a reputation for being 
under-funded and lacking in transparency.  By the early 1970’s, there was a groundswell 
of public support for pension reform, which culminated in the Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974.  This sweeping legislation formally recognized 
the financial vehicles that could be offered within corporate pension plans, and specified 
the tax incentives, accounting rules, and notification/reporting requirements that would be 
required for each type of account.   ERISA also clarified issues regarding employee 
participation, distribution, vesting, matching and termination.   
From an employee perspective, ERISA was especially significant for two reasons.  
First, employee recourse rights were mandated.  As specified within the U.S. Department 
of Labor’s Frequently Asked Questions about Pension Plans and ERISA, pension plan 
beneficiaries have “the right to sue for benefits and breaches of fiduciary duty.”  The 
second important provision, applicable only to defined benefit plans, was the creation of 
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the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation.  This federally chartered corporation is 
defined within the aforementioned Department of Labor Frequently Asked Questions as 
an entity that “guarantees payment of certain benefits if a defined plan is terminated” 
(Department of Labor, p. 1, 2010). 
Types of Defined-contribution Stock Plans 
 ESOP, ESPP, Stock Option Plan, and Individual Equity Plans. 
While establishing rules and regulations for all pension plans was historically 
significant, the fact that ERISA re-defined what constitutes a pension plan was 
revolutionary.  ERISA birthed the defined-contribution pension account, the most popular 
form of pension plan in existence today.  A defined-contribution account defines the 
amount of cash or stock that the employer contributes to an account, but does not 
guarantee a certain monthly or lump-sum payout at retirement.  The balance in a defined-
benefit account is invested, usually in some type of stock plan.  According to a National 
Center for Employee Ownership (NCEO) article titled “How to Choose an Employee 
Stock Plan for Your Company”, defined-contribution stock-based plans fit into four 
broad categories.  These categories include the ESOP (Employee Stock Ownership Plan), 
the ESPP (Employee Stock Purchase Plan), Stock Option Plan, and Individual Equity 
Plans (including the gifting or purchase of restricted stock).  (National Center for 
Employee Ownership, 2010). 
A Focus on the ESOP—its Unique History and Legal Framework 
The first stock-based plan in the NCEO categorical reference is the ESOP.  
Because the ESOP is the only defined-contribution plan given special provisions within 
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ERISA, I will now cover its unique aspects.  Also, I will highlight potential areas of 
confusion between the ESOP and the other stock-based plans.   
Unlike other financial instruments that have emerged after-the-fact out of the 
financial system’s legal framework, the ESOP was fully intentional.  The brainchild of 
lawyer-economist Louis Kelso, the ESOP is an innovation with no financial or legal 
precedent.  Although the worker cooperative shares the premise of employee ownership 
with the ESOP, the enabling financial architecture of the ESOP is unique. 
According to historical information published by the Kelso Institute (2000), the 
ESOP was first used in 1956 to facilitate an employee leveraged-buyout of Peninsula 
Newspapers, Inc. of Palo Alto, California.  Less than a few decades later, the ESOP was 
formally recognized by the U.S. Federal Government, with the passage of the Regional 
Rail Reorganization Act, and finally in 1974, the ESOP was written into ERISA as a 
special provision.  The ESOP would be exempted from a rule restricting pension funds 
from investing more 10% in company stock.  This rule, which had been conceived to 
protect employees from the risk associated with a non-diversified portfolio, also made it 
impossible to transfer a significant percentage of corporate ownership to employees.  
(Kelso Institute, 2000). 
Because the ESOP was recognized by many as both an ingenious and practical 
method of transitioning corporate ownership, special tax provisions to make a change of 
control more financially feasible became part of the legal recognition of the ESOP.  In the 
past, large tax liabilities made it difficult for owners to pass the ownership of a company 
to other stakeholders.  Another problem was that stakeholders often could not raise the 
capital to buy out the owners.   
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The ESOP solved this problem with favorable tax treatment bequeathed to it 
within ERISA.  Of particular note are three special ESOP tax provisions that are 
highlighted within The Democracy Collaborative at the University of Maryland’s 2005 
book titled Building Wealth:  The New Asset-Based Approach to Solving Social and 
Economic Problems.  The first provision addresses the large tax liability that owners 
incur when selling a private corporation.  To offset this significant expense, the owners of 
closely-held corporations, as long as they own at least 30% of the corporation, can defer 
capital gains tax when the company is sold to a worker-owned coop or an ESOP.  The 
next ESOP tax provision aids employees in raising sufficient capital to buy-out a 
corporation.  Given that employees in nearly all instances lack the capital to execute an 
employee buy-out, the ESOP has been IRS-qualified to buy shares from owners using 
tax-deductible corporate funds.  These funds may be obtained by borrowing against the 
future earnings of the company.  The final ESOP special tax provision applies once a 
change of control occurs, when a lack of liquidity may pose a problem.  To increase the 
chance that the ESOP will be a long-term, ongoing concern, it is allowed to fund itself 
with tax-deductible money or stock contributions.  (The Democracy Collaborative at the 
University of Maryland, 2005). 
Confusion between the ESOP and other stock-based plans. 
At this point, it is important to re-emphasize that the ESOP is entirely different 
than the other recognizable stock-based plans.  Because it is both common and 
understandable that the ESOP is frequently confused with the ubiquitous instrument 
known as The Section 401(k) Plan, discussing the key distinctions between them is 
critical.  As documented by Wang in 2002, the 401(k), in contrast with the ESOP, was 
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not expressly established as part of the 1974 ERISA legislation.  It was invented after-
the-fact by private pension fund advisor Theodore Benna.  The special ESOP exemption 
within ERISA was the enabler, however, in that it opened a loophole for the 401(k).  In 
creating the 401(k), Benna took advantage of the ESOP exemption that allowed defined-
contribution plans to have portfolios with more than a 10% investment in company stock.  
In addition, the 401(k) could also be crafted so that corporations could match employee 
deductions with company stock, tax-free.  (Wang, 2002). 
The blurring of lines between the ESOP and the 401 (k) was just one point of 
confusion that was created with the advent of defined-contribution plans.  The new types 
of accounts that had specific treatment within ERISA were complex on their own merit, 
before even considering those that evolved out of the legislation.  Given the difficulty, the 
law of unintended consequences displaced the ability to anticipate permutations and 
innovations that would come out of the legislation.  Simply the nomenclature used to 
describe the sophisticated instruments was not intuitive, in that the difference between 
stock “ownership”, “purchase”, and “option” was not readily apparent.   
As a result, there is still much confusion when one attempts to distinguish one 
defined-contribution plan from another.  There are some qualities of defined-benefit 
contribution plans where generalizations can be made, however; and this is where I now 
turn the attention. 
The Impact of Defined-contribution Plans 
An employer’s perspective. 
Cutting through the aforementioned confusion, in addition to navigating the 
complex details of defined-contribution plans, proved to be time-consuming for both 
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employers and their employees.  As a result, employers would incur large, tangible set-up 
and maintenance costs in establishing defined-contribution plans.  The substantial reward, 
however, would be the employer’s ability to shift the responsibility for the performance 
of the pension account to the employee.  This change of control relieved the employer of 
the commitment attached to defined-benefit plans—the promise to pay the employee a 
certain fixed amount, irregardless of any market conditions.  Another desirable element 
of the defined-contribution plans was the provision of significant tax-based incentives.  
These tax breaks had the effect of boosting corporate earnings, the effects of which were 
magnified if the employer were to contribute company stock to the plan.   
An employee’s perspective. 
Whereas the impact of the defined-contribution plan on employers was largely 
positive, the effect upon employees is a mixed bag.  Whether employees would fare 
better or worse with the defined-contribution plan relative to the defined-benefit plan 
would depend to a large extent upon the employer’s stock performance, stock market 
conditions, and the financial management abilities of the employee.  
To properly manage the defined-contribution account, the employee had to first 
understand the provisions of the account.  There were specific rules, requirements, and 
timeframes for enrolling, vesting, allocating, withdrawing, and terminating.  Attaining the 
knowledge to establish a comfort level would require a substantial commitment of both 
time and energy.  A labor force that had been accustomed to counting upon a pre-
specified amount at retirement had to take financial control, and the payout at retirement 
would hinge upon the employee’s ability to engage. 
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Because most defined-contribution plans were populated with investments in the 
public stock market, the employee had to personally contend with market-based risk.  As 
with an individual financial portfolio, self-determined market strategies could be 
executed by the employee, within the boundaries of investment options provided by an 
employer.  Given the significant responsibility involved, in addition to the special 
initiative required to sign-up for the account in the first place, many employees did not 
even enroll.  
It was now up to the employee, fully dependent upon the stock market, to either 
reap the rewards or suffer the losses.  ERISA had delivered on its goal to provide more 
information and control over the pension account to the employee, in an environment 
where not all employers had been competent in performing their fiduciary duty.  The 
price of this emancipation was the absorption of responsibility and risk; the reward would 
be the opportunity to build assets above and beyond a defined-benefit level. 
Resting upon this observation, we conclude generalizations regarding defined-
contribution benefit plans.  Now we move forward to establish criteria that will identify 
specific differences between the various defined-benefit accounts. 
Criteria for Evaluating Defined-contribution Benefit Plans 
Today, the level of risk and the opportunities for reward depend upon the type of 
defined-contribution plan that the company offers.  Each plan differs in how it shares the 
gains from productivity today, and fosters continuing productivity growth in the future.  
For corporate asset building programs to be helpful and effective, they must thoughtfully 
balance equality with meritocracy and risk with reward.  Going a step further, if a 
corporation desires to be a significant, positive force in society, one that provides 
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solutions to the larger problems the civilization is facing, the opportunity lies here:  to 
make inclusive plans that offer individuals with limited ability to generate assets 
anywhere else, given their limited access to capital, credit or savings, the ability to build 
solid financial assets in their workplace pension plan.   
In determining the precise factors that make a defined-contribution benefit 
pension plan most capable in achieving the goal of building assets for employees, I have 
established the following criteria: 
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1. Offering the opportunity to build equity for a larger number of employees is 
better than one that builds equity for a fewer number. 
2. Providing asset-building capability without requiring an equity contribution 
from the employee is preferable, in that the employees at the lowest income 
levels with less ability to save are not prevented from participating. 
3. Closely coupling employee productivity with reward is most favorable. 
4. Facilitating the sale of company stock through a market mechanism that 
values fundamentals, and mitigates speculative risk (closely aligning 
productivity with reward). 
5. Making employees as owners privy to information, so that they are able to 
augment the perspective of the plan fiduciary with their own analysis of the 
situation. 
6. Providing the opportunity for employees to participate more fully, both as 
owners of company stock and as individuals fully vested in the long-term 
success of the company. 
7. Opening a window for the sale of stock, or allowing a hardship withdrawal or 
loan in the case of a qualifying event, i.e. disability, elder care, hospice care, 
medical expenses. 
8. Allowing the employee to borrow against the pension account for the purpose 
of building other forms of lasting assets, i.e. education, quality child care, 
housing.    
9. Establishing a structure that encourages continuous improvement in 
productivity on the part of all employees, in a manner that increases the 
likelihood that the company will be an ongoing concern. 
 
Given the large wish list, business economists would be the first to ask, “what is 
in it for the corporation”?  The traditional response would be that employers want defined 
contribution plans because they significantly reduce the future liability associated with 
defined-benefit plans.  Therefore, asking for too many things in a defined-contribution 
plan would eliminate its competitive advantage from a cost-avoidance perspective.  
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Furthermore, the neoclassical model assumes that defined-contribution plans can be 
conveniently sold as an employee benefit like health care, providing the justification for 
the company to reduce wages.  Or, the argument could be made that the defined-
contribution plan would simply be used as a self-serving tool to unload company stock.  
(Clearly this line of reasoning requires that corporate compensation policies are rational, 
an assumption that empirical evidence could contradict). 
The neoclassical model does support the possibility that employers would offer 
defined-contribution plans simply because they have the potential to maximize the well-
being of employees, thus making loyalty and productivity the potential reward.  One 
point that both employers and employees can agree upon is that increasing productivity is 
good, both in the short and long run.  Undoubtedly, optimizing productivity is a key 
objective in the crafting of a defined-contribution plan. 
Aside from the effect of the defined-benefit plan upon the employer/employee 
bargain, there is another critical dimension to examine, the relationship of the pension 
plan to corporate finance.  ERISA offers employers a variety of tax incentives to sweeten 
the defined-contribution plans, and in certain cases has enabled companies to use pension 
plans as a source for low-cost equity finance.   The potential advantages of defined-
contribution benefit plans to corporations can be summarized as follows: 
1. Ability to use pension plan as a source of corporate equity. 
2. Favorable tax policies associated with initial funding and maintenance of the 
plan. 
3. Tax-free distribution of dividends. 
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Another issue that is important to note is that defined-contribution pension plans 
can provide a corporation with protection from an unwanted buyout or takeover.  When 
employees hold a significant amount of company stock, it is more difficult for outsiders 
who wish to obtain a significant equity position in the company. 
The ESOP, the Section 401K Plan, ESPP, Stock Option Plans, Individual Equity 
Plans 
Now we are ready to look more carefully at the specific features of the defined-
contribution pension plans.  On the first criteria, regarding the availability of an equity 
building opportunity for the largest possible number of employees, the ESOP, the ESPP, 
and the Section 401K Plan provide an opportunity for everyone to participate.  The 
National Employee Ownership Center specifies that the ESOP must include everyone 
who has worked for 1,000 hours in a 12-month period; the Section 401K Plan is also 
available to all employees that meet age and service requirements.  Employees who have 
been at a company for over 2 years can participate in an ESPP.  Stock options and 
Individual Equity Plans are most often selected offerings used as incentives for primarily 
senior-level employees.  (Rosen, 2002). 
Within the plans that are made universally available, including the ESOP, the 
ESPP, and the Section 401K Plan, the ESOP is the only plan where the individual has no 
personal equity at stake.  In an ESOP, the company contributes the stock to employees; 
very rarely does an employee purchase any stock.  Conversely, an ESPP always requires 
employees to purchase the company stock, at a discount.  While a Stock Option program 
also requires the employee to purchase the stock, she only does so in an environment 
where the market price covers the cost of the option, thus guaranteeing a return.  The 
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401K is funded by employee equity in the form of payroll deductions, which are matched 
in varying degrees depending upon employer policy. 
Now that we have covered the straightforward subjects of “who qualifies” and 
“who contributes”, we move to the complicated matter of how to best align productivity 
with reward.  How does one determine who contributes more or most to company 
productivity?  Is productivity effectively captured by considering relative wage levels?  
Do other factors matter, like years at the company, or critical nature/difficulty of the job 
performed?  
The deliberation looks a bit like the traditional diamond/water paradox.  Good 
management, like the diamond, is assumed to be rarer than labor, thus explaining the pay 
premium.  But without labor, the necessity of which is akin to water, there would be no 
product or service to manage; yet a potentially large army of the unemployed, in as great 
a supply as water, never to be exhausted, reduces both its price and its value. 
Neoclassical economics values employees by the marginal product of their labor.  
In a production environment, it is straightforward to measure the product of labor in 
terms of output generation.  It is much more difficult to determine the marginal product 
of labor in the management realm, where revenue generated, customers retained, 
expenses minimized, shareholder value created, or deadlines met provide a yardstick, but 
one not always directly attributable to the individual. 
Stock options and the issuance of restricted stock most often distribute the gains 
from productivity to the “diamonds”, or a select group of management-level employees.  
These plans frequently bank on future productivity, given that they are often used as 
incentives to either attract or retain talent.  Identified as contributors to the oft-cited 
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concern of grossly inflated of executive pay, stock options and the issuance of restricted 
stock have been associated with the increasing income disparity.  These instruments have 
also been subject to abuse, in that they can be used to circumvent executive compensation 
policies, or to obfuscate the reality of a corporation’s financial condition by recognizing 
compensation liabilities off of the corporate balance sheet.  These incentives have also 
been accused of perversely rewarding executives for short-term productivity at the 
expense of long-term corporate viability, as “cashing out” becomes the objective. 
While Stock Options and other Individual Equity Plans most often selectively 
distribute productivity gains to management in particular, the Section 401K Plan 
distributes productivity gains based upon wage level.  Given that the contributions to the 
Section 401K Plan are a flat percentage of total wages, the larger the wage, the larger the 
employer match.  The ESPP does not take productivity into consideration at all, as every 
employee is entitled to purchase stock in the same amount, at the same time, at the same 
price. 
The ESOP allocations are made without an industry standard or formula, relying 
fully on the discretion and judgment of management.  In the article titled “A Brief 
Overview of Employee Ownership in the U.S.”, it is noted that “allocations are made on 
the basis of relative pay or some more equitable formula.”  (National Center For 
Employee Ownership (NCEO), 2009, p. 1).  If this discretion is executed with care and 
stewardship, it is possible that contribution to productivity could be more equitably and 
realistically measured, by taking into account other influencing factors such as loyalty, 
experience, growth and development.  It is worth further investigation how shares might 
be fairly granted to employees for generating new ideas, products, and markets, or to 
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those that find ways to improve production techniques or administrative processes.  
Expanding the idea of stock grants to encompass more than a provision of incentives for 
senior executives to meet revenue and profit targets could be a beneficial strategy for 
both employees and employers. 
At this point in the paper, I am able to narrow the focus, given the initial set of 
criteria that I have established.  It has been noted that Stock Options and Individual 
Equity Plans do not in their current form offer the opportunity to build equity for a 
substantial and diverse employee population.  Therefore, at this juncture, they do not fit 
into the purpose of this particular paper, which is to underscore the importance of 
expanding asset-building opportunities and to highlight the most effective and practical 
tools that can be used to accomplish the task..  The ESPP can also be placed on the 
sidelines, given that another significant focus of this paper is to correlate asset-building 
with productivity, and the ESPP is not designed to accomplish this task.  Additional 
research on these particular stock-based plans must be left as a tangential, nevertheless 
important future endeavor. 
Although it is already questionable as to whether the Section 401K Plan has any 
special effect upon asset accessibility or productivity, I will continue to look more closely 
at this type of account for other reasons.  Specifically as it relates to both the ESOP and 
Section 401K Plan, I will cover the issue of asset building and uncertainty in equity 
markets, in situations where there is no diversification mandate. 
Comparison between the ESOP and the Section 401K Plan. 
The next step is evaluating the criteria of having the ability to sell company stock 
for a market price that is fair and equitable.  This consideration highlights the potential 
 38 
dangers of pension plans that are heavily weighted in company stock.  The worse case 
scenario happens when the employee uses savings to buy into a pension plan with a large 
percentage invested in company stock, a situation that by nature lacks the investment 
diversity to minimize risk.  Furthermore, there are restrictions in the plan preventing the 
employee from selling the stock.  If the company or the stock price falters, the risk to the 
employee is two-fold; she could be stuck with de-valued stock and find herself without a 
job.  She may have also substituted a maximum contribution to a Section 401K Plan for 
savings or other investment. 
If a company is publicly-traded, a turn in the news or sentiment regarding an 
individual company stock can be deleterious to an employee’s account.  In Wang’s article 
of 2002 addressing problems associated with the Section 401K Plan, she has the 
following comment:  “Studies have shown that though overall market risk has stayed 
relatively constant, individual stock volatility — which stems from company-specific 
events — has more than doubled over the past 30 years. In reality, the evidence for 
wealth building is mixed at best.”  She continues to say that “On average the typical 
401(k) company stock delivers a return in line with the S&P 500’s — but at above-
average risk.  For every big gainer like Citigroup (up 94 percent over the past three 
years), there has been a disaster like Owens-Corning (down 95 percent).  This conclusion 
made in 2002 has special irony, in that Citigroup’s stock performance validated Wang’s 
concern by falling over 95 percent over the past few years.  (Wang, 2002). 
Although the Section 401K Plan does not have to have a majority of its assets 
invested in company stock, this is often the case, given that matches of company stock 
made in employee accounts enjoy favorable tax treatment.  This is what happened in the 
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well-known case of Enron, where Martine Costello’s article in CNN Money titled The 
“Enron Problem” points out that 58% of the Enron 401K was invested in company stock.  
(Costello, 2002). 
Some argue that cases like Enron are rare.  In Costello’s 2002 article, David 
Wray, president of the Profit sharing/401(k) Council, comments that “most companies 
don’t go bankrupt, and the stock has value in the long term” (Costello, 2002, p.1).  This 
perspective has gained some credence in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, given 
the significant stock market rebound.  It is possible that the preservation of stock market 
values has become so politically important that interventions will be always be made to 
prop up values.  Nevertheless, Citigroup stock is still languishing in 2010, and Bear 
Stearns, like Enron, declared bankruptcy.  In the case of Bear Stearns, employee equity 
was wiped out, and the fiduciary may face litigation. 
The pension plan fiduciary is charged with protecting the employee’s financial 
interests.  If there is negative information that leads the fiduciary to believe that the value 
of the stock is going to be significantly impacted, the fiduciary is charged to act.  But, 
there is an inherent conflict of interest because the fiduciary is most often employed by 
the company. 
Offsetting this risk to a certain extent are structural aspects of the ESOP that are 
not characteristic of the Section 401K Plan heavily weighted in company stock.  The 
most important factor mitigating ESOP risk is the likelihood that the ESOP employee has 
not contributed her own savings to fund the pension plan.  In contrast, the Section 401K 
Plan requires funding by the employee, with the employer providing only the matching 
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portion of the account.  Therefore, the Section 401K Plan places the employee’s personal 
contribution at stake. 
Another structural quality of the ESOP that mitigates risk is the fact that most 
ESOP’s reside within privately-held corporations, with Rosen (2008) noting that 90% of 
ESOP’s are held in private corporations.  (Rosen, 2008).  Because the value of most 
ESOP’s are not determined in publicly-traded markets, speculative risk is minimized.  In 
the event that the ESOP does reside in a publicly-traded corporation, it is possible that 
employee ownership is positively correlated with stock price.  As referenced by the 
National Center for Employee Ownership, a study completed by American Capital 
Strategies in 1995 found that in public companies where employees owned over 10% of 
the corporation, “these companies consistently outperformed the broader market indexes” 
(National Center for Employee Ownership, 2010, p. 2). 
Another factor that mitigates ESOP risk is the increased likelihood that ESOP 
companies, relative to non-ESOP companies, will augment their retirement plans with 
offerings that are not tied to company stock.  Research conducted in 2001 by Douglas 
Kruse and Joseph Blasi of Rutgers University and referenced by Rosen (2002) found the 
following to be true:  in ESOP companies, defined benefit plans are offered 30.1% of the 
time, whereas in non-ESOP companies this employee benefit is offered in only 4.9% of 
the cases.  The same study found that the ESOP companies were more generous in 
offering all types of retirement plans.  ESOP’s offered non-401(k) profit sharing 35.7% 
of the time, relative to the non-ESOP companies in 8.0% of instances.  ESOP companies 
had a 401(k) 33.3%, whereas non-ESOP companies offered it 6.2% of the time.  Other 
defined contribution plans were offered 14.7% of the time in ESOP companies, and 2.3% 
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in non-ESOP corporations.  (Rosen, 2002, p. 2).  This same research concluded that 
ESOP participants accumulate on average three times more value in their retirement plans 
than non-ESOP plan participants.  (Rosen, 2002, p.2). 
In ESOP companies, do employees give up wages for these benefits?  Research 
shows this is not the case in all but 1% of the companies studied by a group at 
Washington State University.  This study, quoted by Rosen in 2002, found that ESOP’s 
on average paid wages 12% higher, and a median wages 8% higher, than the control 
companies studied.  (Rosen, 2002, p. 2). 
The most important distinction that mitigates risk and builds long-term employee 
equity is the nature of the ESOP to operate not just as a pension plan or an employee 
benefit, but as structural means of facilitating employee inclusion.  When its full effect is 
harnessed, the ESOP transfers ownership both in a financial and cultural sense.  The 
Democracy Collaborative at the University of Maryland (2005) provides the following 
assessment of the ESOP “ownership culture”: 
ESOP’s that have adopted it (the ownership culture) have made significant 
changes in the way they do business.  Although these changes often fall short of 
work-place democracy, this sector of the ESOP world has succeeded in increasing 
worker participation, further raising productivity and helping stabilize jobs and 
community in the process (The Democracy Collaborative at the University of 
Maryland, 2005, p. 59). 
Specifically regarding the reference to ESOP’s and their positive effect upon job 
stabilization, the Democracy Collaborative is referring to the requirement that ESOP 
companies buy-out the ownership stakes of terminated employees.  Therefore, a decision 
on the part of an ESOP company to close a plant or layoff employees is not to be taken 
lightly.   
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When an ESOP company makes significant company decisions about subjects 
like plant closings or layoffs, employees have a say in the matter.  This right to 
“participate” is mandated within ERISA.  When shareholders are voting on “major 
issues” such as closings and mergers, ESOP plan participants can instruct their pension 
trustee how to vote on the issue.  (The Democracy Collaborative, 2005, p. 60).  The 
Democracy Collaborative (2005) has found that many ESOP corporations are taking the 
concept of participation to an even higher level, by having employee representatives on 
corporate boards.  Even though this representation is not mandated by ERISA, 21% of 
ESOP companies in the year 2000 had an employee representative on the board.  (The 
Democracy Collaborative, 2005).  It would be interesting to know how many companies 
have an employee board representative in 2010.   
It is important to recognize, however, that having representation or a voting 
interest is only one aspect of participation.  Participation also means the desire and the 
ability to engage at various levels within the corporation.  In ESOP companies, or any 
company for that matter, observable organizational forms are an indication of levels of 
involvement or engagement.  The National Center for Employee Ownership (NCEO) in 
its article titled “A Guide to Doing Research on Employee Ownership” notes that “high 
involvement companies would be likely to employ such practices as self-managing 
teams, open book management, and cross-functional teams.”  The article makes the 
following conclusion that “the more ownership and the more involvement, the better the 
results tend to be” (National Center for Employee Ownership, 2010, p.1). 
Undoubtedly, the organizational structure of a corporation is one dimension that 
can make employee participation at all levels more natural.  Corporate structure, 
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however, can not unilaterally foster a genuine ownership culture; creation of this 
atmosphere is predicated upon the open-minded attitudes of the part of both employees 
and management.  If the relationships between either functional groups or individuals in 
the company are more adversarial than cooperative, more compartmentalized than 
expansive, it is difficult for the representation that is mandated within ERISA to manifest 
itself in the kind of participation that makes a positive impact on the bottom line.   
United Airlines, one of the most famous ESOP conversions, is a textbook 
example of this type of behavior.  Pilots protected the interest of pilots, flight attendants 
took care of flight attendants.  ESOP companies that demonstrate the largest gains in 
productivity are the ones where employees don’t solely think like, or just relate to, their 
own “group”, be it pilots, engineers, or shop floor technicians.  Rather, they interact as 
owners with the common goal of making the company successful. 
The United Airlines ESOP also had a higher probability of failing, given that the 
change of control was made when the company was experiencing severe financial 
problems.  This is one major reason that corporations have adopted an ESOP structure in 
the past, in order to avoid the possibility of bankruptcy.  If the ESOP fails in this instance, 
is it difficult to make the case that the situation is worse than it would have been if the 
company had failed in the first place, especially if the consideration is made that the 
employee has not put up any personal equity to buy company stock.  One perspective on 
the situation is that a bankruptcy-avoidance ESOP at the very least buys its employees 
some time. (National Center for Employee Ownership, 2009). 
Neoclassical economics might say that the fundamental premise of the ESOP is 
flawed, if its success is predicated upon the presence of relationships that have an 
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altruistic quality.  Even if we assume that relationships that are more cooperative than 
competitive are not realistic or “normal”, it is important to remember that the ESOP does 
promote self-interest, which is embodied in the corporate contribution of stock to its 
employees.  Studies do corroborate that the financial incentive is a powerful one, in that 
productivity is positively correlated with larger employee ownership holdings.  There is 
also a reinforcing element in that employee participation increases when employees own 
a larger percentage of the corporation.   
The conclusion is that productivity flourishes where material employee ownership 
is accompanied by a representative, participative organizational structure and culture.  It 
is an encouraging sign that recent statistics published by Rosen (2008) show employees 
as majority owners in 40% of ESOP’s, a number which reflects a growing trend toward 
majority ownership.  Although employees in large, public companies with ESOP’s most 
often do not own enough stock to gain a sense of ownership, these plans are in the 
minority, constituting only 10% of ESOP’s. (Rosen, 2008, p.3). 
The presence of an ownership culture is a serious point of distinction between the 
Section 401K Plan heavily weighted in company stock and the ESOP.  One significant 
advantage of an ESOP with an ownership culture is the increased likelihood that 
management will give employees more access to company information.  Even in the 
instances where open book management is not standard practice, employee engagement 
and participation fosters transparency.  In the past, it has been a lack of transparency that 
has enabled corporate management in cases like Enron to mislead investors and 
employees about the financial condition of the corporation.   
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When management and labor are aligned in purpose—to create shared value 
within the corporation—energy is expended in pursuing common goals.  This internal 
alignment is all the more important if the ESOP is being used as a source of equity 
finance.  Outside finance naturally has a different understanding and set of objectives 
than internally-provided equity.  Most often, outside finance will have limited 
understanding of corporate dynamics and industry particulars, with emphasis placed 
predominantly upon meeting short-term revenue goals.  The long-term viability and 
prosperity of the company may not even be the objective of external finance, which in 
some cases may financially benefit more by ultimately taking over a company. 
From a corporate perspective, the condition that makes the ESOP most attractive 
as a corporate finance tool is the tax deductibility of both principal and interest when the 
ESOP is used to obtain a loan.  “For many companies, this is an excellent strategy for 
corporate financing and can cut borrowing costs by one-third.” (Employee Stock 
Ownership Plans, 2009, p.2).  “The company may then use the proceeds for any 
acceptable business purpose such as purchasing equipment, buying another company, 
taking a private company public, or financing the sale of the stock.” (Employee Stock 
Ownership Plans, 2009, p.3).  No other stock incentive plans have this feature. 
The other favorable aspect of the ESOP regarding tax policy is the ability for the 
plan to distribute dividends to plan participants tax-free.  This provision alone can have 
an exceptionally positive effect upon corporate earnings.  The recognition of this benefit 
has spurred further financial innovations, most notably in the form of the KSOP, or an 
ESOP within a 401K.  This move is largely transparent to the employee, who often does 
not even realize that a change has occurred.  The ability of a 401(k) to masquerade as an 
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ESOP, qualifying for ESOP-like incentives without making the same level of 
contribution that is made by an ESOP company has been an area of concern in the past.  
To address any free rider issues, clarity in making distinctions between financial 
instruments is critical.  It is important to remember that ESOP companies meet special 
requirements to qualify for the incentives created within ERISA.  With the typical ESOP 
employee’s retirement plan three times larger than that of the non-ESOP employee, the 
argument can be made that these incentives do in fact directly benefit employees. 
A Closing Word on Defined-benefit and Defined-contribution Plans 
It is true that even though an employee has an opportunity to build assets in any 
defined-contribution plan, there are risks and concerns.  It is not a sure thing like a 
defined-benefit plan payout. In the long term, however, I find that the plan which is most 
congruent with an overall emphasis on asset building is one that can capture each 
employee’s contribution to productivity in a negotiable asset that holds fundamental, not 
just speculative value.  This is most feasible in a privately-held corporation, where the 
market for stock is limited to those who are actually involved in the operations of the 
company.  In this case, the value of the stock should more closely resemble the realities 
of the business. 
A private company also has an advantage in that it is more likely to be of the size 
and scale where an individual’s contribution to productivity can be more clearly 
understood, rewarded, and harnessed.  It is also in this environment where a dearth of 
equity finance is both demonstrable and detrimental.  Without access to capital for 
expansionary purposes, a company is thwarted in making its greatest contribution to its 
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current and future employees, and the economy at large.  It is here where the ESOP most 
clearly demonstrates its elegance. 
Now we finish the section on corporate-sponsored benefit programs that offer 
employees and employers the opportunity to recognize contributions to productivity in 
the allocation of assets.  After various equity-oriented financial instruments were 
examined, the ESOP garnered the major focus.  In the next few sections, I will examine 
the methods that make corporate ownership available to all identified stakeholders.  In the 
process, well-recognized methods that are currently being employed are examined.  
Additionally, new approaches that have been proposed but yet to be implemented will be 
considered.  It will not come as a surprise to the reader that financial instruments 








Chapter Six:  Corporate-sponsored Benefit plans and Customer Ownership 
The ESOP Modified to be a CSOP (Customer Stock Ownership Plan) 
Conceptually and logistically, the basic idea and structure of the ESOP can be 
expanded for use in many other applications.  One application is the distribution of 
corporate ownership not just to employees, but to other stakeholders of a company, 
including customers and consumers.  As with the ESOP, this ownership stake offered the 
corporation a primary source for low-cost equity finance.  
It was Louis Kelso, the inventor of the ESOP, who specifically broadened its 
application to include the CSOP, or a Customer Stock Ownership Plan.  As documented 
by the Kelso Institute, the first use of the CSOP was in 1958, when it successfully 
enabled a group of farmers in California’s central valley to buy out a key supplier, Valley 
Nitrogen Producers. 
Although the CSOP can be tactically used to transfer ownership of a corporation 
to its stakeholders, it does not have the status within the Federal government or the IRS 
like the ESOP.  Because it does not enjoy the same favorable tax treatment, it is not well 
recognized like the ESOP. 
Although the original use of the CSOP was as a leveraged buyout instrument, 
Kelso anticipated that it would be used in a much larger context.  Kelso visualized that 
the consuming public could both finance and own part or all of the companies that 
provided their goods and services.  Corporations could facilitate this expanded ownership 
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operation by using financial tools the built upon the framework of the ESOP.  Clearly, 
Kelso had a plethora of ideas grounded in the use of various innovative financial 
instruments, and he spent a lifetime developing these concepts.  Since his death, the 
communication, advocacy and development of Kelso’s work has become the labor of the 
Center for Economic and Social Justice (CESJ), where much of the information in this 
paper about the ESOP and related financial instruments has been obtained. 
Kelso’s intent for the CSOP was philosophically and functionally very similar to 
that of the ESOP.  His fundamental thought process was that business relationships, 
either between employer and employee, or producer and consumer, can be very 
synergistic.  In the case of the ESOP, if employees experience direct financial benefit 
when the company does well, they have a significant incentive to make the company 
successful.  When the company does well, the employees do well on two fronts--both as 
wage earners and investors in the company.  As employees, they have made a 
commitment to the company, and it is this type of major commitment that makes any 
source of finance both available and reliable.  It is in the ESOP that the elements of 
employment and investment are forged together with a necessary, mutual commitment 
between employer and employee.  A lack of commitment on either side hurts both 
parties. 
Advantages of Stakeholder Finance Relative to Traditional Sources of Finance 
While employees or customers as investors have automatic incentives to be 
committed to the long-term welfare of the corporation, it is the converse with traditional 
contemporary finance.  As the financial sector increasingly becomes the domain of large 
multi-nationals, the incentives to make anything more than a short-term commitment 
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diminish.  The magnitude of these organizations increases the likelihood of strict 
constraints and standardized operating procedures.  These automated responses, which 
often include uniformly calling in existing loans and restricting all lending in a downturn, 
translate into pro-cyclical, contractionary policy.  Direct government action is then 
triggered to augment the negative effects. 
If business cycles are viewed as natural phenomenon, it is to be expected that all 
businesses will be less liquid at certain points in time.  When a downturn would 
otherwise have been temporary, the actions of finance have the potential to force defaults 
that would have otherwise not occurred.  This response can turn the downside of a 
business cycle into a crisis, similar to what has been commonly observed during the 
global financial crisis that started in 2007.  This perspective regarding economic crisis 
has recently gained more credence.  A Wall Street Journal cover page article authored by 
Lahart (2007) documents new-found interest in Hyman Minsky’s Financial Instability 
Hypothesis, which argues that this downward spiral will take place.  (Lahart, 2007). 
It is reasonable to expect that an employee as investor would be less likely to 
overreact or overcorrect than a capital provider from the outside.  Employees, 
unconstrained by standard operating investment procedure, would conceivably have the 
benefit of insider knowledge, coupled with a longer investment horizon.  This perspective 
could be especially beneficial in labor negotiations, where wage concessions in a 
downturn could be guaranteed payback in the future, out of profits generated during a 
recovery. 
The customer as financier could be expected to act in a similar partnership-
oriented fashion, especially if limited substitutes are available in the marketplace.  In the 
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event that customer and company were to reside in the same community, the incentives to 
cooperate financially would be even more powerful.  
Other Benefits Offered by the CSOP and Customer Ownership in General 
Customer ownership from a corporate perspective. 
The loyalty of the consumer as investor has impact both in the capital and 
consumption realms.  Every time the product or service was consumed, there would be a 
dual benefit for the customer, both on the consumption and investment sides of the 
equation.  While loyal employees increase the marginal productivity of labor, or the cost 
side of the equation, customer loyalty positively impacts the revenue side, where 
customer ownership may result in less price sensitivity and/or more consumption. 
When companies have customers as owners, the relationship between the 
company and the customer deepens.  A closer relationship is financially beneficial to the 
corporation on multiple fronts, with an especially important one being product 
development.  Companies already want to get closer to customers, so that they can tailor 
products and services to their customer’s needs and wants.  But to have customers 
invested in the innovation and development cycle of the company, as committed early 
adapters, is a key competitive advantage.  Furthermore, in owning a part of the company, 
customers become more easily retained throughout the entire product lifecycle, which is 
by nature a bumpy ride.   
Customer ownership from a customer perspective. 
Up to this point, we have discussed the advantages of the CSOP predominantly 
from the corporate perspective.  The argument to be made from the customer’s 
perspective is not as compelling, because a fundamental aspect of the ESOP, namely that 
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it is recognized and supported by IRS policy, is not the case with the CSOP.  
Corporations get favorable tax treatment for funding an ESOP with contributions of stock 
to employees.  This is why it is very rare to see an ESOP where the employee buys stock 
to participate.   
With the CSOP, there is no incentive to contribute stock to customers.  Even the 
employer tax benefit associated with the 401(k), the ability to do tax-free matching of 
company stock, is not available to the CSOP.  The net result is that unlike the ESOP, the 
CSOP in its current iteration is not a source of credit, because the customer has to raise 
equity to participate.  Nevertheless, the absence of specific financial incentives does 
nothing to prevent customers from buying stock on the open market if the business 
partner company is public. 
Today’s Alternative to the CSOP—the Direct Public Offering 
In the event that the company is private, customers can participate in ownership 
via the financial instrument termed a direct public offering.  In a direct public offering, 
customers or consumers are given a special opportunity to purchase stock ownership in a 
corporation.  This purchase opportunity is not offered to the general public through the 
traditional Wall Street public-equity markets, therefore it is termed “direct”.  The 
prospects are qualified with the criteria that participants must be true stakeholders.  Thus, 
the potential problem of owners creating anti-competitive effects is averted.  
By floating a direct public offering, a company can raise equity capital directly 
from those who already consume the good or service, or are stakeholders of the company.  
As with the ESOP, this source of equity finance brings capital that should be reasonably 
committed to the long-term well being of the company.  Again, the customer and 
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company are positively linked in a cooperative financial relationship, made stronger if the 
customer and company are in the same geographic area and the product or service is has 
few substitutes. 
Drew Field, an industry specialist in the direct public offering area, nicely sums 
up the benefits of the direct public offering on his dfdpo.com website:  with publicly-
traded shares, the business is “owned by customers of securities firms”.  “With increasing 
financialization of investments, these owners may have no interest in the business, its 
markets, products, services, local economy or management — their only interest is in an 
expected short-term increase in the security’s price.” (Field, p.1). 
Pearson also makes the connection between a direct public offering and the 
microcredit model pioneered outside the United States.  In the “initial microcredit model, 
Grameen Bank, founded by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, required a borrower to be 
in a community of about five other borrowers, with responsibilities to each other.  After 
the start-up or seed capital stage, the next level for growing businesses is to expand its 
community of owners to customers, neighbors, vendors, employees and others who 
believe in what the business is doing.”  (Field, p. 1). 
Like the ESOP, the direct public offering is a successful, working model.  It is a 
financial vehicle that enables companies to raise low-cost capital, while providing 
customers with the opportunity to reap financial rewards that would otherwise be 
reserved for institutional investors.  Unlike the CSOP as proposed, however, the direct 
public offering does not have a means for a customer without savings or foundational 
assets to participate.  Nor does the direct public offering have the special ESOP-like tax 
treatment, with its powerful set of corporate incentives.   
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Although the direct public offering as it is implemented today provides clear and 
distinct benefits to corporations, the CSOP is a conceptual model that incorporates tax 
incentives making customer finance as desirable as the ESOP.  Because corporations 
habitually approach Wall Street to raise capital, using alternative methods of raising 
capital requires a major change of attitude and behavior, even in the event that the 
associated costs are lower, and the likelihood of actually obtaining finance capital is 
higher.  Migration of the direct public offering to an IRS-qualified CSOP-like plan would 
make this approach even more desirable, giving it additional traction and scalability so 








Chapter Seven:  Ownership of Natural Monopolies and Regulated Industry 
An Opportunity to Participate Becomes a Right to Participate 
In the prior chapter we covered the financial instruments that corporations can use 
to raise equity capital, while at the same time building assets for its employees and 
customers.  Regarding both the ESOP and the other employee pension plans, 
participation in ownership, or the sharing of profits and financial benefits, has been 
justified on the basis of contribution to productivity.  In the case of the CSOP, the 
customer relationship is reason enough for participation; yet, any special treatment or 
recognition of the CSOP would also involve justification through contribution--to sales, 
revenue, and overall company success.   
Now we turn our attention to applying asset distribution methods that apply to the 
development, ownership, and direct financial benefit associated with goods and services 
that are naturally monopolistic or delivered through regulated industries.  Whereas the 
ownership of assets up to this point has been discussed within the context of contributions 
to productivity, these goods and services present a new dimension to the argument.  
Community ownership of the commons, including the land, resources and infrastructure 
that provide for the basic needs of everyone within a community, recognizes that citizens, 
community members, and taxpayers can improve economic efficiency by directly 
participating in the creation of value.  Sharing assets that are developed with the 
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participation of the community provides the incentive to participate, where there is 
financially-oriented reward. 
Unless participation is made mandatory, however, not all community members 
will participate or contribute to the process.  This brings up the point that there are 
situations where the right to ownership can be more clearly justified, without the litmus 
test of participation and contribution.  Passive ownership is about fairness; community 
ownership with participation encompasses the principles of efficiency and fairness. 
Kurland, Brohawn, and Greaney (2004) identify natural monopolies and regulated 
industries as attractive opportunities for community member ownership, specifically 
mentioning electric utilities, mass transit and cable systems (Kurland Brohawn, and 
Greaney, 2004).  In these industries, there are a limited number of private, public, or 
cooperative providers that are granted a license, operations agreement, or land use 
contract. 
In these particular examples, government intervention and participation on some 
level is operationally necessary.  Because monopoly industries lack the natural market 
incentives that drive efficiency and quality, government imposes rules and standards.  A 
major efficiency-related problem in these markets is price distortion.  Some of these 
markets operate like set-aside contracts, with little or no competition.  To preserve the 
interests of the consumer, government counteracts monopoly profit-taking.  Other 
monopoly markets provide services that can not be financially supported in traditional 
markets.  In this case, government subsidized service to guarantee access.   
The important distinction in these industries is the presence of active government 
intervention.  Through its government, the public is directly involved in its provision of 
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financial support.  This current involvement strengthens the justification for public 
ownership. 
I suggest that other types of government-provided infrastructure are good 
candidates, including water, garbage, sewage and other recycling systems.  Other 
excellent candidates include green projects and clean energy, where government is 
currently providing financial incentives or subsidies. 
In some cases, especially in the electricity market, stakeholder ownership already 
exists.  It is the cooperative form of ownership that has given community members, as 
customers of a particular enterprise, this opportunity. 
The consumer cooperative. 
The consumer cooperative is an enterprise that disperses pre-tax profits, or surplus 
earnings, to its customers.  Each consumer receives a rebate, the size of which is 
determined by consumption; the larger the usage, the larger the rebate.  Although the 
cooperative does not pay taxes on these allocations, the individual beneficiaries are 
subject to personal income taxes.   
When extended product or service provision is required to meet the needs of a 
particular customer, this customer is often required to provide the capital for the 
expansion.  This capital is used to develop a product, service, or network that will be 
made available not only to the customer demanding and paying for it today, but to anyone 
who needs it in the future.  This up-front cost incurred by the customer, used in the 
development of a natural monopoly or good/service that can be accessed by all, is 
returned in rebates over time.   
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A well-known example of this practice is the rural electric cooperative, which was 
created during President Roosevelt’s tenure as a means of providing electricity to 
underserved rural communities.  The Alaskan pipeline is another example. 
While the cooperative structure effectively distributes profits to stakeholders, it is 
missing a fundamental component of the ESOP-like financial approach—the ability to 
directly link ownership with capital investment and expansion.  To accomplish this task, 
a CSOP could be implemented. 
The CSOP with an Expanded Role. 
Expanding the earlier conception of the CSOP, Kurland, Brohawn, and Greaney 
(2004) offer the following definition of the CSOP: 
An expanded capital ownership vehicle for providing self-liquidating, productive 
credit to the regular customers of public utilities, marketing cooperatives, mass 
transit systems, family health care system(s), etc., linking them as owners to the 
enterprise’s future investment opportunities and capital growth.  For her 
patronage, the regular customer would get back ownership rights, represented by 
shares released to her CSOP account as the CSOP’s debt is repaid with pre-tax 
earnings paid in the form of tax-deductible dividends on CSOP-held shares.  
Released shares would be allocated among users according to their relative 
patronage of the system.  Future dividends on CSOP stock would be used to offset 
each user’s monthly bill.  The CSOP would also create an internal market for 
repurchasing shares when there is no public market for the shares (Kurland, 
Brohawn, and Greaney, p. 124, 2004). 
The new elements added to this iteration include the allocation of shares is 
dependent upon usage, and the distribution of the proceeds used as an offset to 
consumption. If the CSOP were to obtain preferable tax treatment like the ESOP, the 
distributions, like dividends, would be tax free. 
Like the cooperative, the CSOP distributes financial gains to community 
members, who as customers, purchase public goods and services.  Different than the 
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consumer cooperative structure rooted in consumption and designed to recover costs 
incurred by customers financing expansion, the CSOP is an investment vehicle for all 
stakeholders affected by the enterprise.  Within the CSOP, a stakeholder can be a 
customer, supplier, provider, producer, employee, or community member.  Because the 
CSOP is flexible enough to accommodate a diverse range of constituents, it can be 
applied in a variety of situations. 
The CSOP is more than customer ownership. 
One will notice that in the legal description of the CSOP, there is a reference 
made to “family health care systems” as one type of application for the CSOP.  School 
systems have been discussed as well.  Kurland, Brohawn, and Greaney (2004) provide 
more detail: 
CSOP’s could also be combined with ESOP’s for establishing for-profit 
comprehensive health care delivery systems whose ownership and control would 
be shared by all doctors, other healthcare providers and employees and 
subscribers, supplemented by health care vouchers for subscribers with incomes 
below the poverty line.  For-profit educational systems owned by teachers, other 
school employees, and parent-subscribers, could be similarly financed and 
organized (Kurland, Brohawn, and Greaney, 2004, p. 37). 
Goods and services that are needed or consumed by all, especially in the cases 
where the current systems have been challenged to deliver quality service at a cost-
justifiable price, are all areas of opportunity for the CSOP.  Regarding the delivery of 
critical public services, the CSOP solves a common problem by mitigating the tension 
between those who strongly favor either a private or a public solution, where each side 
perceives that the answer is all or nothing.  The CSOP focuses consumers on the 
arrangements that deliver the best quality of service, which may well be a hybrid set of 
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providers.  Consumers as owners also have the incentive to manage costs, which can be 
significantly impacted when the system is used prudently. 
It was proposed in the early discussions regarding health care reform that 
cooperatives be central in the delivery of health care.  Neither the pro-government nor 
pro-business lobbies were proponents, because neither type of competing bureaucratic 
form stood to uniquely benefit from the cooperative approach.  Although both the 
cooperative and the CSOP are corporations, their internal power structure is necessarily 
altered to give the consumer both a stake and a voice.  In the cooperative, it is one person, 
one vote; in the CSOP, it is a representative form of corporate governance that mirrors 
the ESOP. 
Today there are already consumer cooperatives that deliver health care and other 
public services.  The difference is that cooperatives don’t have the corporate-level tax 
advantages that contemporary ESOP’s enjoy.  Therefore, the cooperative is unable to 
finance investment with future earnings, and is also denied the tax deductibility of both 
principal and interest.  If the CSOP can adopt the legal status of the ESOP, capital credit 
will be more readily available and cost effective, for both initially funding the stock 
ownership plan and satisfying the need for future expansion. 
Legal recognition is certainly a critical factor if the CSOP, or any ESOP-like 
financial structure, is to be adopted in the community realm.  In this community domain, 
there is another ESOP-like financial instrument that has been proposed but is yet to be 
formally recognized.  Whereas the CSOP is designed to democratically distribute the 
financial gains from the use and operation of public goods and services, the CIC, or 
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Community Investment Corporation, is designed to share the profit from new 
development with the community. 
Stakeholder Ownership of Land and Development 
The CIC (Community Investment Corporation). 
Whereas the CSOP is especially useful in spreading ownership to customers of 
natural utilities or to providers and consumers of essential services like health care and 
education, the CIC addresses the ownership of land and property.  Property development 
that occurs on publicly-owned land, or receives public subsidy such as TIF (Tax 
Increment Financing) dollars is an ideal candidate for the CIC.   
The CIC is a corporate structure that facilitates shared financial ownership, 
allowing constituents and future residential and commercial occupants to invest in 
development together.  The assumption of the CIC is that tenants and community 
members have a natural stake in the investment.  The stake of community members is 
validated because the project involves, or requires, public participation.  This 
participation can be observed in developer tax breaks, economic subsidies, or in a public 
good claim to the land.  Future residential or commercial occupants have a vested interest 
in the property as users of the development.  If commercial tenants are businesses that 
serve the community, customers benefit as owners also.   
The definition of the CIC, according to Kurland, Brohawn, and Greaney (2004) is 
a “for-profit land planner and private sector real estate developer geared to rational 
innovation and change at the community level” (Kurland, Brohawn, and Greaney, 2004, 
p. 36).  The goal of the CIC is to benefit the community on two levels.  First, the 
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community has a say in how the land is developed, and the community has a voice in 
determining what types of goods and services are provided in the development. 
From a legal perspective, the idea for the CIC comes out of Revenue Act of 1978.  
Added as Subchapter U within this legislation, the GSOC (General Stock Ownership 
Corporation) forms the legal underpinnings of the CIC.  Kurland, Brohawn, and Greaney 
(2004) write about the difficulty of adopting the GSOC framework, writing that “(a)s 
enacted, all citizens of a State could become stockholders of such massive projects as the 
Alaskan gas pipeline.  Subchapter U proved so unwieldy that no State adopted a GSOC 
despite its many attractive ownership incentives.  (Kurland, Brohawn, and Greaney, 
2004, p. 37). 
Because the legal provisions that activate the CIC have yet to be adopted at the 
state level, the predominant community development model is the Community 
Development Corporation (CDC). 
The CDC (Community Development Corporation) 
The key organizational distinction between the CDC and the CIC is that the CDC 
is a not-for-profit entity, thus it does not offer the opportunity for equity participation.  
The Democracy Collaborative(2005) provides the following definition of the CDC: 
Community Development Corporations are typically neighborhood-based, 
501I(3) non-profit corporations—with a board composed of at least one-third 
community residents—that promote the improvement of the physical and social 
infrastructures in neighborhoods with populations significantly below the are 
median income (The Democracy Collaborative, 2005, p. 26). 
The genesis of the CDC was as an affordable housing developer in blighted urban 
areas.  This mission has expanded to include development of infrastructure and services, 
including job training facilities, shopping centers, health care facilities and day care 
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centers.  By attracting and funding business enterprises within a community, the CDC 
broadens the sales and property tax base, and creates new job opportunities within the 
community. 
The CDC has been most visible in areas lacking in social and civic institutions, or 
where government has not been accountable or effective.  In this environment, the CDC 
looks like an arm of municipal government.  Yet, there is a key distinction:  residents 
have more democratic control over the CDC than they have in local government, given 
that the CDC’s board is composed of at least one-third community residents. 
Although some CDC’s actually own businesses and properties, a major source of 
funding in the past has been in the form of government subsidy.  In some cases, funds 
that would otherwise been channeled through government agencies have been redirected 
to CDC’s. Christopher Walker of the Urban Development Institute comments that “over 
the past 30 years, the most promising alternative model to direct government 
administration of community development programs has been that of community 
development corporations.”  (The Democracy Collaborative, 2005, p. 29).  The primary 
reason for this optimism has been the increase in housing values that has been observed 
in certain markets where CDC’s have been active.   
While government funding remains an important component of the CDC model, 
private funding has been rapidly increasing, which has culminated in better overall 
capitalization for CDC’s.  According to the Democracy Collaborative (2005), securing 
additional private funding has qualified CDC’s for tax breaks created by the New Market 
Tax Credits Bill.  This legislation gives CDC’s the ability to sell tax credits similar to 
those offered by the Low Income Housing Tax Credit.  The Democracy Collaborative 
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(2005) concludes that these tax credits have increased CDC affordable housing 
development in markets where future residents earn 50-80% of the AMI (Area Median 
Income).  Nevertheless, this model has been less effective in generating CDC-developed 
housing for potential residents earning less than 30% AMI.  Within this seriously 
underserved market, there are only 43 units for every 100 people.  (The Democracy 
Collaborative, 2005, p. 31). 
For CDC’s to be successful in the residential and commercial property 
development business, they must work with a variety of constituents, including private 
developers and local government.  In developing these partnerships, many CDC’s have 
become involved in political activism and community organizing.  While these efforts 
have built the financial base and created business opportunities, it is a delicate balance.   
Even though the CDC’s express purpose is to serve the best interest of the community by 
listening to its members and responding to their needs, the CDC can only fulfill these 
needs by assembling resources from a multitude of areas.  How these partnerships are 
forged determines how the participants are compensated and ultimately the benefit that 
the community receives.  Navigating the competing priorities in these arenas of political 
and private action is the role of CDC, as an organization positioned to be a powerful 
intermediary.  
Contrasting the CIC with the CDC. 
The CIC is a very different organizational structure from the CDC, given that it is 
owned by the community.  The developer is the community; the expertise and building 
resources are secured in a competitive, rather than a political process.  Nevertheless, 
fundamental processes like zoning are inevitably political, and property development still 
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requires the cooperation of a multitude of participants.  The difference though is that the 
overarching incentive for the CIC is to both to complete the project and make a profit, 
which promotes economic efficiency.  Profits are turned into owner’s equity, distributing 
a portion of the assets to all individuals that reside within the community.  Because future 
residents are also homeowners, they participate in the asset distribution as well.  Sharing 
the equity between the community and the residents provides representation for all 
stakeholders, an arrangement that is consistent with concerns about fairness. 
To be effective, the CIC must balance the needs of the future residents in the CIC 
with the community members that reside in the project area.  While profit is one 
objective, the current cost of providing services is an equally important consideration.   
For example, housing development that meets the needs of the lower end of the AMI 
spectrum may not be as profitable as a focusing upon the more financially feasible 
projects where CDC’s are most successful, notably the 50-80% AMI resident. But a lack 
of housing for certain members of the community is already costing everyone in the 
community.  If housing is not provided by the CIC, a likely alternative is subsidized 
housing which is funded by taxpayers. Subsidized housing is a temporary measure in 
comparison, and does little to improve the future prospects of the individual or the quality 
of life in the community.  Both the CIC and the CDC offer opportunities for individuals 
to build assets by owning a home.   
Both the CDC and CIC satisfy the demand for housing within a community by 
soliciting the input and participation of the community.  In the case of the CDC, one-third 
of the board that is represented by appointed members of the community.  The board of 
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the CIC reflects the composition of company ownership; to be an owner, one must have 
ties to the community. 
With over 4,000 CDC’s in over 50 states, the CDC has proven itself to be an 
effective economic development agent.  Expanding its reach beyond commercial and 
residential real estate development, the CDC has become a community services provider, 
where the CDC’s multi-faceted agenda has come to include “anti-crime projects, graffiti 
removal, policy advocacy, (and) retail promotion.”  (The Democracy Collaborative, 
2005, p. 31).  Irregardless of the project, its central role is the same:  facilitating 
public/private partnerships to satisfy collective needs and solve shared problems.  First 
and foremost it is an institutional framework that distributes assets within the community, 
with input and participation from the community.  The benefits of these assets are 
measured in increased resident retention rates, reduced unemployment, improved school 
attendance and performance, and increased availability of goods, services, and housing.  
The financial impact is evidenced in the expansion of the tax base.   
The CIC is different in that unlike the CDC, it is not an intermediary.  The 
community works directly with industry to satisfy its needs, and in doing so, it builds 
assets that provide direct financial benefit to the community members, as individuals 
owning stock in the CIC.  The needs of the community are best met when community 
members and businesses work effectively together to create the most efficient solutions.  
Affordable housing, infrastructure, commercial property and civic improvements are 
planned, developed and financed internally, by using the framework of the ESOP. 
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In the realm of residential real estate, the CIC is a shared equity model, where 
both the community and residents are asset owners.  Another shared equity model is the 
land trust, the next topic of discussion.   
The Community Land Trust—a hybrid solution. 
The community land trust (CLT) is a special kind of Real Estate Investment Trust 
(REIT).  The CLT is like a private community real estate market, where equity gains are 
shared in a pre-determined fashion by the homeowner and the trust, thus eliminating 
speculative market risk.  This shared appreciation is conservative enough to preserve the 
affordability for the new owner, while allowing the seller to realize a modest return on 
investment.  
In the CLT model, the resident owns the mortgage on the house, and the trust 
owns the land, which is leased back to the homeowner for a small fee.   Because of this 
arrangement, the community and homeowner are inextricably linked.  Both sides have the 
incentive to work with one another, to protect each other’s interests.  The commitment 
built into this relationship is one reason that the CLT has been successful.  For example, 
the CLT and homeowner are both involved in the mortgage loan process, ensuring that 
the agreement is free of superfluous or egregiously high fees, confusing disclosures, or 
other unethical provisions.   
Making sure that the mortgage is both a fair and affordable agreement is the first 
thing that the CLT and homeowner do together.  This financial partnership continues, 
however, in that any modification of the original mortgage, in the form of a refinance or 
home equity loan, can not be done without the involvement of the CLT.  The CLT’s role 
is to protect the long-term financial well-being of the home owner.  To reduce reliance 
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upon second mortgages or home equity loans, some CLT’s make internal funds available 
to homeowners for upgrades, expansion, and improvements.   
This collaboration between the CLT and the homeowner is one reason that the 
rate of foreclosure is so much smaller in the CLT than in the larger population.  As 
reported by Temple in 2010, research conducted in 2007 concludes that the CLT 
homeowner rate of foreclosure is 0.06%, 33 times less than the foreclosure rate for 
mortgages in the general population.  Temple (2010) attributes 40% of these foreclosures 
to a refinance that makes homeownership unaffordable.  Homeowners within a CLT must 
work closely with CLT management to take out a new or modified loan on their property 
(Temple, 2010). 
The supporting structure of the CLT, from both a financial and management 
perspective, is a private/public partnership.  Private financial support of CLT’s is often in 
the form of land or real estate that is donated and qualifies for favorable tax treatment in 
return.  On the public front, CLT’s have multiple sources of finance, including state 
government loan programs and federal funding programs like the Neighborhood 
Stabilization Program (NSP).   Under the auspices of the NSP, CLT’s have worked 
directly with homeowners who are facing foreclosure because of an unaffordable 
mortgage.  The CLT first purchases the home and then sells it back to the homeowner 
who takes out a new mortgage that is both traditional and conforming.  
The management structure of the CLT reflects this combination of private and 
public support and funding.  The board is comprised of one-third residents, one-third 
community members, and one-third elected or appointed government representatives.  
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The CLT is different from a housing cooperative in this respect, in that all coop board 
members are homeowners. 
Because the management of the CLT determines market rules, including who 
participates in the exchange and the terms of the exchange, the speculative component of 
real estate investment is eliminated.  Although it is difficult to measure the full effect that 
controlling speculative activity in the closed market of the CLT has upon open market 
value, a good reference point can be found in the form of property taxes.  Higher property 
taxes discourage speculative investment, by making it less financially attractive for non-
resident investors to purchase real estate.  Studies have shown that communities with 
higher property taxes have experienced less erosion in residential real estate prices during 
the economic crisis, even in communities that have suffered disproportionately higher 
losses within industry and employment (Sullivan, p. 3). 
Managing the financial risk associated with the real estate transaction is one 
reason that CLT’s have helped individuals secure assets safely.  One critique of real 
estate as a financially beneficial asset-building instrument comes from outside the 
transactional aspect of the purchase.  In the case of the owner-occupier with few initial 
assets, the impact of the living situation—the surrounding environment—is very 
important.  Securing the best available living situation means being aware of, and 
sensitive to, the specific location of the real estate.  The conundrum is that the most 
affordable real estate is found in the least desirable locations, in marginal neighborhoods.  
Because a lack of affordable housing is the primary reason that CLT are formed in the 
first place, the CLT most often operates in communities with a naturally favorable 
location.   
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Living in a desirable area provides access to a set of assets that have long-term 
financial impact.  These assets often include an effective educational system, developed 
physical infrastructure, and the provision of services that maximize health and safety.  
These assets are central to the creation of a cohesive community, which bodes well for 
both business and personal development.  Upward mobility is most often attained through 
relationships, through personal connections and networks.  Safe and physically appealing 
communities make it easier for people to know each other, learn from each other, and 
share ideas and information, whereas marginal neighborhoods can close residents off 
from one another and the outside world.  Residing in a neighborhood with limited 
prospects for change and growth diminishes the quality of life today and the future 
potential of tomorrow.  These negative impacts have the potential to offset equity gains.  
If there are few strong institutions to buttress the community, real estate values 
are compromised from the start.  As discussed earlier, value is created by participation 
and contribution that occurs and multiple fronts.  Financial institutions, appraisers, 
regulators, public officials, individuals, and communities need more comprehensive tools 
to assess both the current condition and future prospects of a neighborhood and the real 
estate that resides within it.  Doing this effectively requires measuring the long term 
value of investments that are capable of turning a marginal neighborhood around.  On the 
surface, many of these investments look like nothing but a sunk cost, when in fact they 
have the potential in thoughtful execution to be precisely the opposite.  A public library 
could be offered as one example.  This asset has has positive spillover effects on the 
value of surrounding assets.   
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It was in the provision and preservation of public goods that the land trust found 
its initial inspiration.  In responding to what was really a market failure, the conservation 
land trust provides a vehicle for managing public goods, in an environment where 
creating a viable long-term proposition for public use has been difficult.  The profitability 
of the investment in this type of public good hinges upon realizing and distributing the 
equity gains fairly, which requires an acknowledgement that equity gains are in reality 
are most often the result of shared efforts.  Both the conservation and community land 
trust models have responded to a significant observation:  the synergy between 
individuals and the larger community has economic value, which is materially recognized 
in the appreciation of physical assets.  The CLT is shared-equity model that is designed to 
accurately capture and distribute these returns.  
In the open market, there is no shared equity model which mitigates risk yet 
provides for equity gains, nor are there other recognized methods within real estate 
markets that identify and minimize speculative risk.  Without a CLT-like structure, home 
ownership involves risk.  Other methods that offer more flexibility and a different risk 
profile are available.  Another investment opportunity this is available to a select group of 
individuals is the IDA (Individual Development Account).  The ISOP (Individual Stock 
Option Plan) is another type of individual account that has been proposed, with its 








Chapter Eight:  Individually-owned Accounts that Facilitate a Broader-based 
Distribution of Assets 
The IDA (Individual Development Account 
The vehicle for individual asset formation, separate of any relationships with a 
particular corporation or service provider, is the (IDA), or Individual Development 
Account.  Invented by Michael Sherradon, the IDA matches an individual’s savings up to 
a certain limit.  Account funds can be used for housing, education, or business 
development.  (The Democracy Collaborative, 2005). 
The goal of the IDA is to accumulate personal savings so that productive assets 
can be acquired.  Even though the goals of the 401(k) and the ESOP appear to be the 
same as that of the IDA, the IDA has two fundamental distinctions.  First, it has a shorter-
term investment horizon, where one can use the account without penalty to acquire assets 
today.  Although one can borrow against a 401(k) or apply for a hardship withdrawal and 
be approved under certain circumstances, the ultimate goal is to accrue tax-free funds for 
retirement.  Such is the case with the ESOP as well.  Unless there is a special ESOP 
diversification election or the employee leaves the company, the account can not be 
borrowed against or liquidated. 
The second key difference is how the IDA is funded.  The IDA is a subsidized 
account, where income levels required for qualification and percentage matching policies 
are controlled at the state level.  Regardless of state policy, the target market for the IDA 
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is the working poor, whereas the 401(k) and ESOP are available to all employees, 
independent of income level. 
The ISOP (Individual Stock Ownership Plan) 
Dovetailing off of the ESOP and the CSOP is another financial instrument called 
the ISOP, or Individual Stock Ownership Plan.  Although never formally recognized by 
the IRS, the ISOP was part of legislative proposal termed the Accelerated Capital 
Formation Act.  As originally proposed in 1975, the purpose of the ISOP was to broaden 
access to capital.  Unlike the ESOP or the CSOP, the ISOP was not predicated upon a 
prior relationship with a particular corporation, as either an employee or a customer.  Nor 
did the ISOP require that a shareholder be a customer purchasing services from a natural 
monopoly or a community member with a public good stake in property or real estate 
development.  A definition of the ISOP as provided by Kurland (1977): 
The ISOP is designed as a special kind of Individual Retirement Account (IRA) to 
be set up by each citizen at any bank or approved financial institution, for 
financing new stock issuances by any enterprise that can convince a commercial 
bank that it has a viable (i.e., self-liquidating) capital project (Kurland, 1977, p. 
1). 
Because the ISOP was designed to be structurally and relationally independent, it 
could function both as a long-term store of value for individuals and an ongoing source of 
equity finance for multiple corporations.  This flexibility opened up further possibilities 
for the financial instrument, including the opportunity to serve as a central point for 
individuals to roll over shares from an ESOP or CSOP. 
Given its flexibility and broad structural framework, the ISOP could be used to 
establish a diversified portfolio of assets for a broad range of people.  It could also raise 
equity finance for both start-up companies and corporate expansion. 
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The ISOP becomes the CHA (Capital Homesteading Account) 
To more clearly distinguish the scope of the opportunity and overall mission, the 
ISOP was renamed the CHA, or Capital Homesteading Account.  The CHA now forms 
the cornerstone of a larger policy initiative, termed the Capital Homesteading Act.  The 
Capital Homesteading Act would do for capital what the original Homesteading Act of 
1862 did for land:  democratize the access to productive resources to stimulate national 
growth and foster individual opportunity. 
The CHA brings in an entirely new dimension to the stable of financial 
instruments modeled after the ESOP.  Most notably, the CHA goes beyond the creation 
of equity finance in situations where there is either collateral or future earnings against 
which a corporation can borrow.  Because of the increased risk profile associated with the 
CHA, there are more institutional components that are added to the mix to make the 
situation more feasible. 
Supporting Structures for the CHA 
The FCCC (Federal Capital Credit Corporation). 
One institutional component of the capital homesteading infrastructure is a 
Federal Capital Credit Corporation, or FCCC.  The FCCC serves not only as a 
clearinghouse for potential investment opportunities, but as body that is capable of 
evaluating potential risk, reward, and opportunity.  Kurland, Brohawn, and Greaney 
(2004) offer the following explanation of the FCCC, an organization conceived by Dr. 
Norman Bailey, former Special Assistant to President Reagan for International Economic 
Affairs. 
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The FCCC, which could be owned and controlled by CHA lenders and citizens, 
would package insured CHA loans, create software for helping lenders to 
scrutinize the feasibility of CHA loans, and set uniform standards for CHA 
insurers, re-insurers, and lenders.  The FCCC and competitors qualified by the 
Federal Reserve would then bundle and take these securitized CHA loans to the 
discount window of the regional Federal Reserve Bank (Kurland, Brohawn, and 
Greaney, 2004, p. 39). 
Within the proposed definition of the FCCC is found the genesis of another CHA-
supporting organizational structure, one that serves as an insurer or re-insurer of CHA 
loans.  This organization would be termed the FCIC, or Federal Capital Insurance 
Corporation.   
The FCIC (Federal Capital Insurance Corporation). 
To provide insurance for default risk, an FCIC, or Federal Capital Insurance 
Corporation has been proposed.  The FCIC would fund itself by collecting a risk 
premium as part of the loan servicing fees.  Individual financial institutions would collect 
these payments, which would then be consolidated into an FCIC insurance fund.  Another 
possibility is the formation of a CCRC, or capital credit reinsurance corporation.  The 
reserves for the CCRC could be provided by federal, state, local government or be raised 
from private sources. 
Problems, Issues and Opportunities with the Supporting Structures 
The supporting structures of the FCCC, FCIC, and CCRC have been proposed 
because the CHA is designed to offer finance and investment opportunities to the 
broadest possible population with the least tenable amount of risk.  From the outset, 
although the mission is laudable, the institutional structure is understandably suspect.  Of 
concern is that fact that the FCCC has a likeness to Fannie-Mae”, given its bundling 
facility that would purchase loans from participating financial institutions.  Also like 
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Fannie Mae, the FCCC would have procedures and regulations for qualifying applicants 
and financial institutions. 
There are also perception and execution problems with the FCIC and especially 
the CCRC, which appear on a cursory overview much like AIG, the large re-insurer.  If 
the credit corporation were to sell groups of loans and bundle them into complex 
financial instruments where the value is the underlying asset was divorced or no longer 
understood, this would be a problem.  Given past problems, tying the FCIC directly to the 
companies it insures, and avoiding the association of the capital homesteading idea with 
the business of buying, selling, and insuring speculative financial instruments is 
important. 
What is important to remember, however, is that the idea of the CHA with an 
insured component brings back some of individual financial surety that was lost in the 
move from defined benefit to defined contribution programs.  In this context, the FCIC is 
not much different than the government-sponsored Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation.  The only difference is that individuals can naturally diversify their 
portfolios, and in the process, capital is directed into productive investment.  Because of 
the equity finance component, business has much to like about the CHA, which in this 
realm mirrors aspects of the 401(k).   
If executed with thought and care, the CHA has the potential to offer the best of 
both the defined benefit and defined contribution worlds.  The critical and unique 
distinction that has been proposed, however, would be that the CHA architecture would 
be owned by CHA financial institutions and CHA account holders.  This eliminates much 
conflict of interest by aligning motivation and incentives in the same way that the ESOP 
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when well-executed has done for employees and employers.  The ultimate challenge for 
the CHA architecture would be to do what the current government organizations that 
promote homeownership have not been able to do:  to democratically expand the 
ownership of capital, in the way that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were originally 









Chapter Nine: Conclusion 
This paper encourages the reader to think about the creation of economic value.  It 
is hoped that this effort will expand points of view that are largely influenced by 
traditional economic models and standard policy approaches.   
Simply on the premises of basic observation and experience, I have found 
economic models that address production and investment to be limited in their 
explanatory power, given their restrictive assumptions.  These assumptions have imparted 
a false sense of certainty, allowing us to base our understanding upon an incomplete 
picture of what is really happening.  The net result is that the sources of contribution to 
productivity, especially the human elements that create value, often fail to be fairly 
recognized or rewarded.  Thus, the power of economic incentives to stimulate economic 
progress and innovation are compromised. 
These unidentified contributions to productivity have observable effects upon the 
value of assets, the level of profits, and the return on investment.  In each of these areas, 
there is an also an opportunity to correct the distortion of incentives.  In this paper, I have 
highlighted a variety of options and methods, assessing their functionality and identifying 
their strengths and weaknesses.   
While these methods first and foremost promote efficiency and fairness, the 
benefits are wide in both range and scope.  They include the creation and preservation of 
employment, the augmentation of income, and the stimulation of individual productive 
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investment.  Some of the methods discussed are expressly designed to mitigate financial 
and asset-market risk, having built-in incentives that favor productive rather than 
speculative investment.   
The approaches that properly align individual incentives also solve problems for 
corporations and communities.  From the corporate perspective, the asset-distribution 
methods alleviate the well-recognized problem of capital scarcity, which is affects both 
current business operations and the opportunities for expansion.  I find that the ESOP 
(Employee Stock Ownership Plan), and other financial tools built on the foundation of 
the ESOP, offer both opportunity and future promise when implemented with care. 
The ESOP carves assets out of current productivity and finances investment by 
anticipating the development of future productivity and capacity.  Because this approach 
stimulates effective demand, a positive, macroeconomic spillover effect is created.  These 
gains are not accomplished through the redistribution of assets, but through the sharing of 
financial gains.  Either a contribution to productivity or a natural claim to surplus 
legitimizes the shared ownership.  I hope that the justifiable nature of these distributions, 
along with the macroeconomic benefit that these distributions create, can more easily 
foster a consensus among policy-makers.  
While these methods can be expanded to offer desirable benefits to a wide variety 
of stakeholders within the corporation and community, reaping substantial returns is 
dependent upon the participation and cooperation of all parties to the agreement.  
Productivity increases with participation, and the fruits of laboring together to accomplish 
a common goal can then be justly and fairly distributed.  This is strong motivation to base 
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relationships upon sharing, commitment, and engagement.  This atmosphere facilitates 
the free-flow of ideas and information, creating a desirable environment for innovation. 
I hope that we are able to re-frame our conception of economics and the world to 
see the possibilities and potential—the stored value and energy that resides within people, 
natural resources, and financial capital—so that innovation will forward the goal of 
economic progress.  Implementing financial and organizational structures that that incent, 
recognize, and reward contributions to productivity are a fundamental way of achieving 
these goals. 
With its ability determine the fate of all people on earth, economics is all-
powerful.  This position implies ethical accountability.  As virtual stewards of the world 
around us, our purview moves from what is, to what we can do, to what we should do.  
By utilizing the wide range of policy tools available to us today--options that do not 
involve the re-distribution of income, but justly and fairly expand the ownership, 
management, and development of productive assets--we come closer to the meeting the 
objective of making people’s lives better. 
I will end with the encouraging words of Alfred Marshall, printed in Principles of 
Economics textbook and quoted later by Bowles and Gintis (2000): 
Now at last we are setting ourselves seriously to inquire whether it is necessary 
that there should be any so called “lower classes” at all:  that is whether there 
need be large numbers of people doomed from their birth to hard work in order to 
provide for others the requisites of a refined and cultured life; while they 
themselves are prevented by their poverty and toil from having any share or part 
in that life…the answer depends in a great  measure upon fact and inferences that 
are within the province of economics; and this is it which gives to economic 
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